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THE DRUDGE CASE: A LOOK AT ISSUES IN
CYBERSPACE DEFAMATION*
Robert M. O'Neilt
In the days following Newsweek's January 1998 decision to defer
publication of an expos6 of President Clinton's alleged affair with White
House intern Monica Lewinsky, attention focused on the medium where
the story first appeared: Matt Drudge's online gossip column, The
Drudge Report.' Though his postings on this issue seem to have been
substantially accurate, Mr. Drudge has recently been sued for
defamation2 because an earlier Report carried a story of a quite different
sort, in which even he conceded there were some flaws.3 That lawsuit
provides a vehicle through which to explore a fascinating array of legal
issues unique to the rapidly emerging field of online defamation. No
current controversy better illustrates the novelties of free expression in
cyberspace4 than the Drudge lawsuit.5
The facts of the Drudge case are as follows. Late in the summer of
1997, Sidney Blumenthal was about to resume his new role as a White
House Assistant.6 He was startled to learn from the Drudge Report that
he was rumored to have "a spousal abuse past that has been effectively
covered up."7  The source? Unnamed "GOP operatives."8  When
" Speech given before the Computer Law Association, University of Washington, Seattle,
Washington, on February 12, 1998.
t Professor of Law, University of Virginia; Director, Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection
of Free Expression.
1. Howard Kurtz, Clinton Scoop So Hot It Melted: Newsweek Editors Held Off in Scandal Story,
Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 1998, at C1. The Drudge Report is available at <http:www.drudgereport.com>
(visited July 19, 1998).
2. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
3. See John Schwartz, Journalism's Old Rule Should Apply to Cyber-Libel, Wash. Post, Jan. 26,
1998, at F20.
4. "Cyberspace" is the general term referring to medium of communication where people and
business interact by means of computer networks, electronic bulletin boards and commercial online
services. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329,2334-35 (1997).
5. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44.
6. See Edward Felsenthal, A Web of Intrigue: The Internet's Bad Boy Has His Day in Court, Wall
St. J., Mar. 11, 1998, at Al; Howard Kurtz, Cyber-Libel and the Web Gossip-Monger: Matt
Drudge's InternetRumors SparkSuit by White House Aide, Wash. Post, Aug. 15, 1997, at G1.
7. Kurtz, supra note 6, at G1.
8. Felsenthal, supra note 6, at Al.
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challenged on the accuracy of the claim, Mr. Drudge promptly retracted
and removed the offending paragraph. He publicly apologized to the
Blumenthals. Mr. Drudge later admitted this was "a case of using me to
broadcast dirty laundry, adding, "I think I've been had."9 The implication
was that one of his partisan sources had tricked him to achieve an
admittedly congenial partisan goal.
The retraction and apology was not enough to satisfy the Blumenthals.
They promptly filed a thirty million dollar libel suit against Mr. Drudge
and America Online (AOL) in the District of Columbia court."0 America
Online was named as a defendant because AOL provided the principal
vehicle by which readers could access The Drudge Report." This novel
lawsuit will compel at least one court to determine the extent to which
defamation in cyberspace differs from defamation in other, more
traditional media. A quick overview of the legal issues will suggest how
substantially the resolution of those issues may diverge when the
defamatory statements appear on the Internet rather than in print.
The Drudge case raises a host of intriguing and difficult questions.
Since Mr. Drudge lives and writes in California, jurisdiction is a
threshold issue. On what basis might the courts of the District of
Columbia compel the physical presence of a purely electronic visitor?
Who qualifies as an Internet "publisher" for the purposes of defamation
liability? What counts as "publishing" in cyberspace? To what degree
does the First Amendment privilege of fair comment on public officials
and public figures 2 apply to online libel? What variants are required by
the nature of the medium? How does the concept of retraction apply, if at
all, in cyberspace? Finally, and perhaps most intriguing of the issues
generated by the Drudge case, is a quandary posed by Mr. Drudge's own
extenuations: If an online journalist publishes informally, lacking editors,
lawyers and many of the other indicia of traditional print or broadcast
medium, should such a journalist be held to a substantially lower
standard of care? 3 In fairness, Mr. Drudge's plea for leniency is not
unique. Far better established media, even with lawyers and editors, seem
9. Kurtz, supra note 6, at G1.
10. See Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44.
11. Id. at 50; see also Linton Weeks, Clinton Aides Sue Columnist and AOL Over Abuse
Allegations, Wash. Post, Aug. 28, 1997, at DI; Linton Weeks, The Tangled Web of Libel Law,
Wash. Post, Aug. 30, 1997, at Al.
12. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring public official
to prove actual malice to recover damages in written defamation action).
13. See Schwartz, supra note 3.
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to view cyberspace a bit differently, and less rigorously, than traditional
print media.
14
A prime example of publishers viewing the Internet differently from
print media was the Dallas Morning News's web edition release of the
purported but fabricated Timothy McVeigh confession."5 Quite recently,
the same newspaper posted on the web a story about the elusive Secret
Service agent alleged to have seen Clinton and Lewinsky alone at a
compromising moment.'6 A few days later, that lapse was followed by
the Wall Street Journal's web edition rumor about a White House
staffer's claim that he told a grand jury of a similar tryst. 7 A presidential
spokesman remarked upon that allegation: "The normal rules of checking
or getting a response to a story seem to have given way to the technology
of the Intemet.... .""
We will return later, and at greater length, to this perplexing issue of
journalistic standards. First, we should probe several other novel
dimensions of defamation in cyberspace. Lawsuits begin with
jurisdiction, and so might we. There has been ample litigation the last
three years over the power of courts to reach those whose only contact
with the forum state is making possible the receipt of an electronic
message in that state. 9 While the results are not in perfect harmony,
workable standards seem to be emerging. If a non-resident defendant
merely posts a Web site that may be accessed by anyone through the
Interet, assertion of jurisdiction solely because one forum resident has
in fact accessed that page (and may claim to have suffered some injury as
a result) would not comport with well-settled standards of "minimum
contacts" for traditional media.2"
14. See, e.g., Tom Kenworthy, McVeigh Appeal Alleges Errors in Bomb Case, Wash. Post, Jan.
17, 1998, at AS; Howard Kurtz, Dallas Paper's Story Traveled Far Before Being Shot Down, Wash.
Post, Jan. 28, 1998, at D1.
15. See Kenworthy, supra note 14.
16. See Kurtz, supra note 14.
17. Janny Scott, Internet Story Revives Question on Standards, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1998, at A20.
18. Howard Kurtz, Wall Street Journal Story is Rushed Onto the Web, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 1998,
at A12.
19. See, e.g., David L. Stott, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Constitutional
Boundary of Minimum Contacts Limited to a Website, 15 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 819
(1997).
20. See, e.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), ajfd, 126
F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) (putting up Web site in Missouri that is accessible anywhere does not support
personal jurisdiction under New York long-arm statute).
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If, however, an electronic communicator has done anything more
substantial than creating a Web page, jurisdiction may well exist.2
Sending an email message might suffice.' Creating an interactive Web
page, and using that page to communicate for commercial purposes with
a correspondent in the forum state, may suffice to sustain jurisdiction.'
Anything more substantial will almost surely satisfy the constitutional
standard of "minimum contacts," though, of course, significant
differences in the scope of state long-arm statutes will yield variations in
the degree of actual judicial power over non-resident defendants.24
Mr. Drudge, who at first vigorously disputed the D.C. federal court's
assertion of jurisdiction, is arguably within the reach of that court, even
though he spends most of his time in California. He gathers news in the
District, and presumably exploits sources who live or work there (such as
the "GOP operatives" who misled him regarding the Blumenthal's
marital condition). His presence seems to go beyond simply posting
online material that may be accessed freely by D.C. residents, although
the question of jurisdiction is not an easy or obvious one.
A concurrent cyber-libel case may sharply test the limits of
jurisdiction over the Internet. A Northern Virginia police officer named
Baitinger recently filed a defamation suit against the son of a woman he
had arrested.z5 The son had posted a pointed and potentially defamatory
account of the mother's arrest on a Web site called Police Brutality Page
on the Internet.26 Incidentally, Officer Baitinger seemed to realize he was
about to make legal history. When a reporter asked if he felt the posting
had seriously damaged his reputation, he replied that he had heard from
fellow officers near and far.27 Then he added, in a perceptive comment,
"the World Wide Web is exactly what it says-worldwide."'28
21. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414,417-19 (9th Cir. 1997).
22. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (making demands on
plaintiff by sending electronic messages sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction).
23. Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997).
24. See Telco Communications Group v. An Apple A Day, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 404,406-07 (E.D.
Va. 1997) (discussing cases that address effect of Internet on redefining jurisdictional bounds).
25. See Motion for Judgment, Baitinger v. Fajardo (Cir. Ct. Va. 1997) (No. 160034) (on file with
author).
26. Id. at 6; see Police Brutality Page (visited Dec. 30, 1996) <http://www.aoha.netl-frzbee.
pagfourt.html/> (on file with author). This Web site no longer exists.




The editor of the Police Brutality Page, one Alan Folmsbee, is a co-
defendant in this case. Though the complaint lists him simply as "address
unknown," we do know his virtual whereabouts: his email address is
frizbee@aloha.net and the URL for the Police Brutality Page was
<http://www.aloha.net/-frzbee.pagfourt.html/>. But in real space we
know only that he lives somewhere in Hawaii, where he has yet to be
served. One assumes he has knowledge but not notice of the case, at least
in the requisite legal sense. Even if Mr. Folmsbee is eventually served,
the issue of jurisdiction will be troublesome; his only contact with
Virginia seems to be passively posting online accounts like the one that
drew Officer Baitinger's wrath.
Yet, Mr. Folmsbee seemed to have interacted with some of his
sources. The postings were occasionally embellished with a bold-faced
italic paragraph headed "Comments from the Web Page Author" wherein
Mr. Folmsbee reacted to the stories he received. Thus, Mr. Folmsbee is
more than simply the proprietor of a passive digital kiosk. On the other
hand, he seems somewhat less active than a publisher like Matt Drudge,
whose amenability to forum state jurisdiction seems more likely.
Mention of the legal status of Internet communicators as "publishers"
evokes a second issue of growing importance. The earliest cases on
cyber-libel addressed that issue, and yielded a pair of judgments that
defined the poles of the spectrum. In 1991, a federal court held that
CompuServe was not a publisher, with respect to defamatory material
posted by an operationally separate and independent entity.29 But in
1995, a New York state court took a quite different view of Prodigy's
liability for material that had been posted in a closely monitored chat
room.3" Most of the hard cases fall somewhere in between.
Congress came to the rescue before any more cases got to court.
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 19963' absolves
Internet service providers of liability for material posted by others over
whom they have no control.32 We now have a definitive ruling by a
federal appeals court on the scope of section 230, one that confers
substantial immunity on the Internet service provider. In November
1997, the Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of America Online in a case that
29. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
30. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 805178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 11, 1995).
31. 47 U.S.C.S. § 230 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
32. 47 U.S.C.S. § 230 (c).
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might otherwise have imposed liability for displaying material that was
not only harmful, but effectively ruined the business of a telephone
marketer named Kenneth Zeran.33
While the district court based its exculpatory holding entirely on the
statute, 4 the court of appeals went substantially further. The Fourth
Circuit held that even absent such a protective statute, an Internet service
provider should not, as a First Amendment matter, be liable for
defamatory material posted by others and for whom the provider bore no
responsibility." We now have in the Zeran case a clear First Amendment
precedent for the view that ISPs enjoy broad immunity for such third-
party material.
The Zeran ruling brings us back to Matt Drudge and the Blumenthals.
America Online (AOL) cited section 230 and the Zeran case as the basis
for its dismissal from the Blumenthals' suit.36 The plaintiffs' complaint,
however, sought to circumvent that shield by invoking the complex and
mutually beneficial relationship between author/publisher and provider.3 7
When AOL expanded its online resources last summer, it touted in a
press release the hiring of "Runaway Gossip Success Matt Drudge."3"
The nexus here is arguably much closer than those to which section 230
and the Zeran case apply.
On April 22, 1998, however, the district court ruled, albeit reluctantly,
that America Online was as free of civil liability in the Blumenthal case
as it had been in Zeran.39 The court found in section 230 a clear
congressional intent to exempt Internet service providers--"[w]hether
wisely or not"-from a broad range of potential tort claims.4" That
conclusion followed despite a degree of editorial control that seemed to
the court to make it "only fair" to allow defamed persons to proceed
33. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, No. 97-1488, 1998
WL 111522 (June 22, 1998).
34. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997).
35. Zeran, 129F.3d at 333.
36. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44,49-51 (D.D.C. 1998).
37. Id. at 51-53.
38. AOL News (visited July 15, 1997) <http:llwww.db.aol.comlcorplnews.presslview?release
=201> (on file with author).
39. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44; see also Bill Miller, AOL Off the Hook in Drudge Case, Wash. Post,
Apr. 23, 1998, at BI; David Stout, America Online Libel Suit Dismissed, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1998,
at A21.
40. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 49.
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against the provider.4! ' The plaintiffs immediately declared their intent to
appeal.42 The reviewing court will tell us much about the potential
liability of ISPs beyond passive access.
Too much passivity could still create liability. There could be
situations in which a provider or network left in place damaging material,
of which it was aware through notice or complaint, for so long a time as
to imply its endorsement or at least acquiescence. One recalls that the
Dallas Morning News left the purported McVeigh confession on its web
edition several weeks after it had been wholly discredited.43 There is one
print case that seems closely on point. An industrial employer was found
liable to a worker for failing to remove offensive and damaging graffiti
from a plant bulletin board long after the victim had complained.' Such
a rule presumably applies in cyberspace, notwithstanding section 230 and
the Zeran case. If a provider has both the technical and legal capacity to
remove offending material, but fails to do so for an unconscionably long
time after being notified, then liability might follow without impairing
free speech.
Discussing a publisher's potential liability raises questions about the
concept of publication. It is black-letter law that words are not
defamatory unless they have been published.45 If A insults B face-to-face
with a false charge, but no one else overhears it, A may have offended,
but has not defamed. The same is true of false accusations in a sealed
envelope, or of the typical two-way phone call.
What should the rule be for person-to-person email? It would be quite
naive to assume such messages (unless encrypted) are truly confidential.
At the very least, email is likely to be backed up and stored in a central
computer. Often, purportedly personal messages may be intercepted in
less benign ways. The risk of a third party accessing almost any email
message seems so high that I would propose a simple, if novel, rule:
publication should be presumed in an online libel suit. The defendant
might rebut the presumption and prove the contrary, for example, with
evidence that the message was encoded in a highly secure fashion that
would make interception highly improbable.
41. Id at 51-52.
42. Miller, supra note 39, at B 1.
43. See Kenvorthy, supra note 14, at A8.
44. Tacket v. General Motors Corp., 836 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1987).
45. Lawrence H. Eldredge, The Law ofDefamation § 35, at 205 (1978).
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We might add one other publication issue before moving on-an issue
actually raised in a recent unreported case. Suppose a libelous story
initially appears online--say in a newspaper or magazine's web
edition-and the next day first appears in print. And suppose (this was a
real case) a lawsuit is filed two years to the day from the print
publication. Is that suit time-barred where the limitations period is two
years? It seems obvious that the claim should be dismissed on that basis.
The cause of action runs from the moment of publication, and not from
the first appearance of the libel in print.4 6 There might be narrow
exceptions, for example, where the electronic text was encrypted on its
way to the printer, or where access to the digital version was limited to a
group among whom the communication would have been privileged
even in print. Otherwise, we should accept the idea that publication is
publication, regardless of format, and that the clock runs from first
posting in any medium.
We move now to some very basic issues arising under the Sullivan
privilege of fair comment.47 This defense has always been viewed as a
"media" privilege. Justice Brennan, in his eloquent opinion, spoke of the
need for "breathing space" so the press could effectively pursue its task
as a watch dog of government." Thus one might wonder whether people
like Matt Drudge may even claim the privilege.
The issue is not an easy one. The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed
the nonmedia defendant question only once.49 In the mid-1980s, the
Vermont Supreme Court declined to follow a lower state court which had
specifically denied the Sullivan privilege to a credit-rating agency
because it was not "media."5 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, but on a
different ground, and failed to address the issue of the privilege of fair
comment to media defendants. 1 If Dun & Bradstreet, the publisher of the
46. See, e.g., Mikaelian v. Drug Abuse Unit, 501 A.2d 721 (ILL 1985) (barring defamation action
because statute of limitation began to run when defamatory letter was published, not when plaintiff
discovered existence of defamatory writing); see also Eldredge, supra note 45, § 13, at 36
(advocating non-distinction on forms of defamation and stating "it is not the form of publication
which is important but the factors... in Restatement, Torts, Section 568 (3)").
47. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
48. Id. at 272 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963)).
49. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
50. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Inc., 461 A.2d 414, 417-18 (Vt. 1983), afj'd,
472 U.S. 749 (1985) (ruling that credit agencies are not type of media worthy of First Amendment
protection as contemplated by Sullivan).
51. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 749.
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credit rating, can claim the privilege, why not Matt Drudge? This issue
should now be addressed much more directly than it has been to date.
A central rationale for the Sullivan privilege may not, however,
translate in cyberspace. One premise for the "fair comment" privilege
has always been the unusual capacity of a public official (later a public
figure as well) to respond to charges that falsely damaged his or her
reputation.52 In short, if a public official calls a press conference, they
will come. Justice Powell expanded on this point, noting that public
officials and public figures have uncommon recourse to self-help,
specifically because they have "significantly greater access to the
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic
opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals."53
This factor, along with the Harry Truman maxim, "if you don't like the
heat, stay out of the kitchen," has undergirded the fair comment privilege
from its inception.
Given this rationale, one commentator has argued that everyone in
cyberspace should be treated as a public figure.54 The Internet has been
characterized as a "textbook marketplace for the trade of ideas,"55 a view
that gains reputable support from Justice Stevens's opinion striking down
the "indecency" ban.56 Thus, it is pointed out that while one can be
libelled on the Internet before a large segment of the population, it is also
possible for the victim to post a "nearly universal and instantaneous
response.""
That responsive capacity, so the argument goes, enables the victim of
online defamation to issue an immediate reply in a chat room or
newsgroup, and thus reach at once the very audience that saw the initial
libel.5" It is therefore suggested that everyone who claims to be defamed
in cyberspace should be treated as a public figure.59 Every libel plaintiff
52. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
53. Id,
54. Jeremy Stone Weber, Note, Defining Cyberlibel: A First Amendment Limit for Libel Suits
Against Individuals Arising.from Computer Bulletin Board Speech, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 235,
261 (1995).
55. Id. at 263.
56. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (holding unconstitutional provisions of
Communications Decency Act of 1996 prohibiting transmission of obscene communication on
Internet).
57. Weber, supra note 54, at 268.
58. Id. at 269.
59. Id, at261.
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would then have to meet the "actual malice" standard-a very high
threshold that few public persons claiming to be defamed in print ever
succeed in meeting.'
The argument is beguiling, but seems seriously flawed. For starters, it
gives exaggerated importance in the constitutional equation to the "call a
press conference and they will come" factor. At least as central to the fair
comment privilege are such other factors as the "stay out of the kitchen if
you don't like the heat" maxim, and the Court's consistent emphasis on
freedom of expression's need for "breathing space... to survive" in a
robust debate.61 Moreover, as a practical matter, the above argument
makes highly questionable assumptions about the capacity of a defamed
person to reply in cyberspace.
Take the Drudge case, for example.62 While the husband is
undoubtedly a public official or a public figure, the wife's situation is far
less clear. Although she is on the federal payroll, hers is hardly a
household name. Now, suppose they were genuinely private figures.
Though the Blumenthals did persuade Mr. Drudge to retract his
accusation, the damage had already been done in ways the subjects could
not easily refute or redress. Beyond the immediate publication, which
one could conceivably correct by posting online protests, collateral
damage would likely result from republication in other media, including
newspapers and magazines that one could not easily allay through the
Internet.
Even if the Blumenthals had created their own Web page, the
concordance between their readership and that of the Drudge Report
would likely be minimal, far lower than the typical overlap between even
politically disparate print media. If a libel victim does not have a
personal Web page, but finds in the false charges an impetus to create
one, the damaging statement would have already wounded deeply by the
time the truth could be posted. This leaves aside the question of who,
among the audience for the libel, would seek out that newly created page
among the hundreds that go online every day. If the defamatory message
first appeared in an interactive format, which the Drudge Report does not
offer, there may be slightly greater hope of reply.6' Yet, the task of
60. Id.
61. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,272 (1964).
62. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
63. A Web site is "interactive" if it allows its users to trade information with the host computer.
See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414,418 (9th Cir. 1997).
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getting there in time, and reaching the audience that had viewed the
offending message, would still be daunting.
There may be situations to which the "responsive capacity" argument
applies more comfortably. Recall the case mentioned earlier of the
Virginia police officer and the posting on the Police Brutality Page.' His
status as public official and public figure for purposes of the fair
comment privilege is unclear; courts have split on how to treat
defamation plaintiffs very much like him.6' Thus, his capacity to reply-
if it were substantially greater online than in print-could tip the balance
against him on this threshold issue. Though the author/editor maintains
some control over what gets posted, and while the Page at its last
appearance contained no messages sympathetic to law enforcement, an
externally-posted response to a damaging accusation already on the Page
might survive and attract some attention. At least that potential channel
of recourse might incline a court to resolve doubts online in favor of
public figure status in what would, in print, be a close case.
There are several other respects in which the difference among print
and cyberspace media may have legal import. Where the digital format
of the initial message creates a readier right of reply, that fact might bear
upon the measure of damages. If a person whose reputation has been
harmed online fails to pursue responsive channels that a reasonable
person would have pursued in mitigation, a court might take that fact into
account in measuring damages. Such recourse might also bear upon the
appropriateness and timing of a retraction in states where retraction
serves to mitigate a libeler's liability. Thus, the "every plaintiff a public
figure" notion, while by no means universally applicable to digital
defamation, may have some use in cases where an expanded ability to
respond does exist.
It might be useful to take stock before moving to the final issue of
standards and responsibility. Issues of jurisdiction have been extensively
addressed by the courts, and a rule seems to be emerging: anything more
than a passive posting accessible in the forum state confers jurisdiction.
Internet service providers can no longer be held liable as publishers for
64. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text
65. Compare, e.g., Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518 (Minn. 1991) (ruling that county probation
officer qualifies as public officer and is required to show actual malice to prevail in defamation suit),
with Ellerbee v. Mills, 422 S.E.2d 539 (Ga. 1992) (holding that principal in public high school is not
public official and therefore not required to establish malice to recover in defamation action).
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material posted by others.66 However, a host of electronic speakers with
greater control over content are in a different situation; their potential
liability will continue to be assessed under rules carried over from print.
As for public officials and public figures under the Sullivan privilege of
fair comment, it seems unlikely that electronic bulletin boards and Web
pages would be excluded from the privilege's protection because they are
not traditional media. Finally, it would be unsound to treat every online
libel plaintiff as a public figure just because there are more opportunities
to reply online. However, in situations where electronic rebuttal is
genuinely easier and faster, that factor might help in resolving close
cases.
What about Matt Drudge's claim that he should not be held to quite so
rigorous a standard of care as his more established print counterparts?67
The argument has at least a superficial appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court,
in the "indecency" case last summer, waxed eloquent about this exciting
and bold new medium of communication---"a vast platform from which
to address and hear from a world-wide audience of millions of readers,
viewers, researchers, and buyers."6 Justice Stevens added that "[a]ny
person or organization with a computer connected to the Internet can
'publish' information."69 Thus, Mr. Drudge might invoke the highest
legal authority in the land in support of his plea for leniency.
In this respect he seems to have reputable company. Earlier we noted
two recent occasions when the Dallas Morning News web edition posted
conjectures that had not been subjected to the scrutiny that should have
precluded publication in print.7 Then there was the Wall Street Journal's
comparable lapse, in its web edition, with regard to a rumored Clinton-
Lewinsky sighting.7' Apparently, the editors of these web editions enjoy
substantial autonomy not only from the print newsroom, but from the
front office as well. We have yet to find in court any suit against a
regular print medium for material that appeared only in digital format,
but such cases cannot be far in the future.
Matt Drudge is not the first online publisher to face a libel suit.
Several years ago, Brook Meeks settled a similar claim after protracted
66. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
67. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at F20.
68. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329,2335 (1997).
69. Id.
70. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
71. See Scott, supra note 17, at A20.
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negotiations.72 Although Mr. Meeks is a highly esteemed and acclaimed
journalist who sought no special dispensation, the medium was a new
online journal like the Drudge Report. Had it not been settled, the Meeks
case might have given the courts the first opportunity to visit the issue of
basic legal standards for online defamation. The Drudge case almost
certainly provides the vehicle for doing so. Since Mr. Blumenthal is
actually a far more seasoned journalist than Mr. Drudge, neither party
seems likely to quit the battlefield early.
The case for a lower legal standard for online publishers surely cannot
turn on Mr. Drudge's own rather casual characterization of his craft: the
fact that, as a one-person editor/publisher, he does not enjoy the benefit
of a battery of lawyers, editors, or executives to guide or supervise him
in what should and should not be published on his Web site. Such a
claim has never availed a print publisher who is small, new, or avant
garde, and lacks the safeguards that metropolitan dailies and weekly
news magazines and major broadcasters have at their disposal.
That view is surely the conventional wisdom. It has been so often
reiterated lately that Mr. Drudge must begin to feel something of a
journalistic leper. 3 As Washington Post Internet expert John Schwartz
wrote of the Drudge case a couple of weeks ago: "The First Amendment
is the First Amendment here and in cyberspace.... The case will turn on
the same issues that any newspaper or television libel case would."'74
Schwartz observed: "Today's Internet journalists... are at about the
stage of the pamphleteers of the 18th century, inveighing against Thomas
Jefferson and the truth be damned. Their right to speak had to be
protected, but the right of others not to be damaged had to be protected
as well."'75
72. Brook Meeks is an on-line journalist who posted on his Web page that a corporate entity,
Suarez Corporate Industries, is a scam. See Marie D'Amico, Steer Clear ofLegal Potholes: Avoiding
Legal Liability on the Web, Digital Media, May 31, 1996, at 12. Mr. Suarez sued for defamation and
Mr. Meeks settled out of court. Id.
73. See. e.g., Felsenthal, supra note 6, at Al.
74. Schwartz, supra note 3, at F20. An early ruling by the district court suggests that Mr. Drudge
may enjoy even less protection than do regular print journalists. While dismissing America Online as
a defendant in the Drudge suit, the court characterized Drudge as "simply a purveyor of gossip" who
may not even be able to invoke the Sullivan privilege in a libel suit brought by a public official and
public figure. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). Mr. Drudge, when informed by
a reporter of the ruling, responded, "I'm not a journalist. I'm a kangaroo! I'll see Mr. Blumenthal in
court,"--an implication that he may no longer contest the court's jurisdiction. David Stout, America
Online Libel Suit Dismissed, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1998, at A21.
75. Schwartz, supra note 3, at F20.
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Nonetheless, so confident an assertion of the conventional wisdom-
to which I must confess I fully subscribe-may do a subtle injustice to
the Matt Drudges, the Brook Meekses, and the Alan Folmsbees. They
are, after all, the Thomas Paines of the 1990s. 76 Recall what happened
just two years ago when the first reporter for an online journal sought a
pass to enter the U.S. House and Senate press galleries. 7' Because he did
not write for a traditional, established newspaper on which you could soil
your fingers, or report for a radio or television station you could receive
over the air or on cable, he was initially barred by the judgment of the
regular press corps. 7 They soon came to their senses, reversed this
unconscionable slight, and welcomed to the gallery their first online
colleague.79 Since then, other representatives of the digital media have
been accredited. Matt Drudge has now been anointed as a media
questioner on "Meet the Press." 0
As we have acquired a better understanding of the wonders of
cyberspace, perspectives have changed rapidly. One may confidently
argue, as I would, that Matt Drudge is wrong when he pleads for a lesser
standard of care in libel cases. In so doing, let us not commit the error of
the gatekeepers at the Capitol who initially denied a press pass to the first
online journalist. They might have done the same to Thomas Paine, and
would later have confessed their error with comparable chagrin. We
ought to be able to maintain print-media standards within the First
Amendment, while at the same time welcoming-indeed embracing-
the special qualities and the marvelous potential of new and wondrous
communications technologies.
76. Mark Fitzgerald, Defending Web Journalism, Editor & Publisher, Feb. 14, 1998, at 50
(quoting Merrill Brown, editor-in-chief of MSNBC, interactive joint venture newspaper between
NBC and Microsoft) ("We [interactive newspapers] must not let the behemoths of the news media
judge us by the gadflies of the Internet. We are not Matt Drudge any more than Liz Smith is the
mainstream media."). Matt Drudge is no longer a uniquely American institution. He appears to have
a Canadian counterpart, Pierre Bourque, who posts political rumors and gossip from Parliament Hill
on his Web site, the Bourgue Watch at <http://www.bourque.org.>. See Tanya Davies, Cyber
Scoops, MacLean's, Apr. 13, 1998, at 12, 12.
77. See Graeme Browning, No Pass for Net Publisher, Nat'l J., Apr. 6, 1996, at 777, 777.
78. Id.
79. Lindsay Sobel, Slate Gets Credentials Despite Lawsuit, The Hill, Apr. 23, 1997, at 7, 7.
80. See Felsenthal, supra note 6, at Al.
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